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Abstract
Introduction Medication errors in the intensive care unit (ICU)
are frequent and lead to attributable patient morbidity and
mortality, increased length of ICU stay and substantial extra
costs. We investigated if the introduction of a computerized ICU
system (Centricity Critical Care Clinisoft, GE Healthcare)
reduced the incidence and severity of medication prescription
errors (MPEs).
Methods A prospective trial was conducted in a paper-based
unit (PB-U) versus a computerized unit (C-U) in a 22-bed ICU of
a tertiary university hospital. Every medication order and
medication prescription error was validated by a clinical
pharmacist. The registration of different classes of MPE was
done according to the National Coordinating Council for
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention guidelines. An
independent panel evaluated the severity of MPEs. We
identified three groups: minor MPEs (no potential to cause
harm); intercepted MPEs (potential to cause harm but
intercepted on time); and serious MPEs (non-intercepted
potential adverse drug events (ADE) or ADEs, being MPEs with
potential to cause, or actually causing, patient harm).
Results The C-U and the PB-U each contained 80 patient-days,
and a total of 2,510 medication prescriptions were evaluated.
The clinical pharmacist identified 375 MPEs. The incidence of
MPEs was significantly lower in the C-U compared with the PB-
U (44/1286 (3.4%) versus 331/1224 (27.0%); P < 0.001).
There were significantly less minor MPEs in the C-U than in the
PB-U (9 versus 225; P < 0.001). Intercepted MPEs were also
lower in the C-U (12 versus 46; P < 0.001), as well as the non-
intercepted potential ADEs (21 versus 48; P < 0.001). There
was also a reduction of ADEs (2 in the C-U versus 12 in the PB-
U; P < 0.01). No fatal errors occurred. The most frequent drug
classes involved were cardiovascular medication and antibiotics
in both groups. Patients with renal failure experienced less
dosing errors in the C-U versus the PB-U (12 versus 35 serious
MPEs; P < 0.001).
Conclusion The ICU computerization, including the medication
order entry, resulted in a significant decrease in the occurrence
and severity of medication errors in the ICU.
Introduction
In 1999, the Institute Of Medicine reported that 44,000 to
98,000 people annually die in US hospitals as a result of med-
ical errors [1]. Medication errors occurring either in or out of
the hospital are estimated to account for at least 7,000 deaths
each year [1]. Medication errors can occur in all stages of the
medication process, from prescribing to dispensing and
administration of the drug. Although most of these errors arePage 1 of 9
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drug event (ADE) [2-6]. According to Bates and colleagues
[3,7], 1/100 in-hospital medication errors result in an ADE,
and 7/100 have the potential to do so. Overall, 28% to 56%
of all ADEs are judged preventable, and most of these errors
occur in the ordering stage of the medication process
[3,6,8,9]. It has been shown that the attributable cost ranges
from $10 for a medication error without harm, to more than
$5,000 for a serious ADE [10]. In intensive care unit (ICU) set-
tings, the rate of preventable and potential ADEs is even
higher, being almost twice as high as in non-ICUs [11]. This
can be attributed to the high number of drugs that ICU
patients receive, the preference for intravenous administration
and the incidence of organ failure, all of which increase the
potential for errors [11,12].
Studies published by the ADE Prevention Study Group indi-
cate that prevention strategies targeting systems rather than
individuals are more effective in reducing errors [13]. Compu-
terized physician order entry (CPOE) has been recommended
by the Leapfrog group as a major step to improve patient
safety in the USA [10]. CPOE could eliminate many of the
problems associated with manual drug order writing [1] by
decreasing the occurrence of illegible orders, inappropriate
doses and incomplete orders [14], which results in a substan-
tial reduction in medication errors of 55% to 80% [7,15-17].
On the other hand, less sophisticated or older CPOE systems
may have the potential to introduce new problems [18-22].
Until now, CPOE has never been shown to decrease patient
morbidity or mortality [23], but seems to be especially helpful
in preventing minor errors [17,22]. An intensive care informa-
tion system (ICIS) is a computerized system specifically
designed for the ICU. All recent commercial ICISs have incor-
porated CPOE, and some systems combine this with varying
degrees of clinical decision support systems (CDSSs). Only a
few authors have studied the impact of CPOE in the ICU, and
even less have investigated the occurrence of medication pre-
scription errors before and after the implementation of an ICIS
[22,24-27]. A recent article by Shulman and colleagues [22]
showed that CPOE without CDSS was able to eliminate many
of the minor errors, but introduced new, potentially more seri-
ous errors in their ICU.
In one unit of our ICU, we implemented an ICIS with incorpo-
rated CPOE and a moderate level of CDSS. The objective of
this study was to evaluate and compare the incidence and
severity of medication prescribing errors (MPEs) between this
CPOE unit and paper-based units.
Materials and methods
Setting
The study was conducted in a tertiary care University Hospital
over a five week period (21 March to 28 April, 2004). The 22-
bed surgical ICU was divided into three adjacent units of 8, 6
and 8 beds.
Study design
A prospective, controlled cross-sectional trial was conducted
in two paper-based units (PB-Us; total of 14 beds (8 + 6)) ver-
sus one computerized unit (C-U; 8 beds), 10 months after
implementation of the ICIS in the latter unit. Patients were ran-
domly assigned to either of these units by an independent
nurse. All units had a similar case mix of patients. Medical staff,
consisting of five senior intensivists and three residents,
rotated continuously over these units, usually on a one-week
basis. One month after the completion of the study, the ICIS
was implemented in the two other remaining units. Approval of
the ethics committee was obtained; informed consent was
waived.
A surgical ICU-independent clinical pharmacist with experi-
ence in medication errors analyzed every medication order of
randomly selected patients during this five week period and
recorded every possible MPE. Physicians and nursing staff at
the units were completely unaware of the ongoing study. As it
was not possible to screen every patient on a daily basis
because of lack of time, patients were picked with a minimal
pause of one day between selections. All medication and fluid
prescriptions were checked for errors in:
1. Drug (brand or generic) name (illegible, abbreviations,
wrong name).
2. Dosing (overdose, underdose, dose omitted).
3. Dosage interval (incorrect dosage interval, dosage interval
omitted).
4. Pharmaceutical form.
5. Preparation instructions (incorrect or omitted solvent or dilu-
tion, if not available on standard nursing charts).
6. Adequate drug monitoring (no monitoring, wrong drug mon-
itoring, if necessary according to normal hospital practice).
7. Route of administration (incorrect route, route omitted).
8. Infusion rate of continuous medication (wrong rate, rate
omitted).
9. Double prescriptions.
10. Clinically important drug-drug interactions.
11. Contra-indications to the prescribed drug.
12. Known allergy to the prescribed drug.
The appropriateness of drug choice was not considered. Tran-
scription errors in the PB-U were taken into account. The phar-Page 2 of 9
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and the laboratory data. Renal function was noted for every
patient and renal failure was defined as calculated creatinine
clearance less than 50 ml/minute. The parameters needed to
calculate the creatinine clearance were always available in
both the PB-U and the C-U. In addition to the pharmacists'
own professional knowledge, clinical guidelines (Up to Date®,
Waltham, MA, USA) and an interaction data bank (Thomson
Micromedex®, Greenwood Village, USA, and Physician Desk
Reference® 2003, USA) were used. Errors were identified
within 24 hours after prescription, and further classified into
different types, categories and possible causes, according to
the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) guidelines, which pro-
vide a standard language for reporting medication errors [28].
Classification of level of severity of medication errors occurred
according to an adjusted numeric scaling system (based on
the NCC MERP taxonomy) [28,29]. The NCC MERP severity
classification was modified, since this classification is ade-
quate for administration errors, but not entirely for prescription
errors.
An independent panel, consisting of one clinical pharmacist,
not involved in the registration part of the study, and two inten-
sive care specialists, evaluated independently the severity of
MPEs at least one month after screening. The panel was
blinded for specific patient characteristics, as well as for
patient group assignment. If agreement was not achieved dur-
ing the first review, the three panel members discussed the
incident until they reached consensus.
The description of groups according to level of severity of MPE
is shown in Table 1. We identified three groups: minor MPEs
(no potential to cause harm); intercepted MPEs (potential to
cause harm but intercepted on time); and serious MPEs (non-
intercepted potential adverse drug event (ADE) or ADEs,
being MPEs with potential to cause, or actually causing patient
harm).
Description of the ICIS
The implemented system concerned an ICIS with incorpo-
rated CPOE and a moderate level of CDSS (Centricity Critical
Care Clinisoft, GE Healthcare Europe, Helsinki, Finland), with
full connections to monitors, ventilators, syringe pumps and
also connection with the hospital information system for
administrative patient data and laboratory results. The CDSS
consisted of several different functionalities. There was a pos-
sibility for facilitated medication prescription by means of pro-
tocols for specific patient groups, for example, liver transplant
patients or neurotrauma patients, with separate protocols for
subgroups with renal failure or sedation. When choosing a
drug, the most commonly used prescription with correspond-
ing drug dose was shown, together with the different dosing
schemes for renal insufficient patients (according to creatinine
clearance, intermittent or continuous hemodialysis) and for
patients with severe liver dysfunction. All these prescriptions
Table 1
Descriptions of level of severity of medication prescription errors
Major divisions Numeric scale Description (NCC MERP scale)
Minor MPE 0 Incomplete order, no potential to cause harm (A)
Intercepted MPE 0,5 Potential error, intercepted, error did not reach the patient (B)
Serious MPE
N-I potential ADE 1 Error reached the patient, but caused no harm (C)
ADE 2 Error occurred, resulted in increased patient monitoring, but no harm to the patient (D)
3 Error occurred with change in vital signs, increased need of monitoring or laboratory tests, eventually no 
harm (D)
3.5 Error occurred with temporary harm, needing treatment/intervention (E)
4 Error occurred with temporary harm, needing treatment with another drug, increased length of stay or 
required intervention to prevent permanent impairment or damage (F)
5 Error occurred and resulted in permanent patient harm (G)
5.5 Error occurred and resulted in near death event (H)
6 Error occurred and resulted in patient death (I)
MPE, medication prescribing error (an error in the prescribing or monitoring of a drug); for example, an order written for aminoglycosides, without 
ordering a drug plasma level, or without a route of administration. Minor MPE: minor medication prescription error (an MPE that has no potential to 
cause harm); for example, an abbreviation or a missing route of administration. Intercepted MPE: an MPE that has the potential to cause patient 
harm but did not because the error was intercepted in time. N-I Potential ADE: non-intercepted potential ADE. ADE: adverse drug event; these are 
further specified according to level of severity (level 2 to 6). The N-I potential ADEs and ADEs consist of serious errors because they have the 
potential to or actually cause injury and, therefore, are the most important from the perspective of patient safety. For this reason, these two groups 
are joined into one serious MPE group. The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) scale is 
mentioned for comparative purposes.Page 3 of 9
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tions of commonly prescribed medication appeared at the time
of prescription as pop-ups. Physicians were also notified
about a number of important and possibly life-threatening
drug-related complications (for example, QT interval changes
with erythromycin). The allergy status of the patient was shown
by means of a differentially colored highlighted icon in the tool-
bar as well as in the general prescription window. Sophisti-
cated CDSS in the form of real-time alerts notifying the
physician to adjust drug dosages to changing organ failure
was lacking.
Statistical analysis
The primary outcome measure was the difference in incidence
and severity of MPEs in the C-U versus the PB-U. Secondary
endpoints were univariate correlations between patient char-
acteristics (APACHE II, renal failure, number of drug prescrip-
tions (at screening day) and the number of MPEs.
Nonparametric data were analyzed with the Kruskal-Wallis and
Mann-Whitney U tests. These data are presented as median
values (with 25th and 75th percentiles). Nominal data were
compared by using chi-square analysis or by Fisher's exact
test as appropriate. Correlations between continuous varia-
bles were calculated by the Spearman rank correlation test. All
reported tests are calculated two-tailed, and P < 0.05 was
predetermined to represent statistical significance. All statisti-
cal analyses were carried out with SPSS 12.0 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA).
Results
During the five week study period we analyzed 160 patient-
days in 90 different patients. Both the C-U and the PB-U
group contained 80 patient-days. Patient characteristics are
shown in Table 2.
A total of 2,510 medication and fluid prescriptions were eval-
uated by the clinical pharmacist, comprising 1,286 in the C-U
and 1,224 in the PB-U. In the C-U, 44 MPEs occurred versus
331 in the PB-U (3.4% versus 27.0%, P < 0.001). Overall, the
ICIS resulted in a relative reduction of 86.7% for all types of
errors associated with medication ordering. These results are
shown in Table 3.
In the C-U, the minor MPEs were mainly wrong pharmaceutical
form errors and infusion rate errors. The intercepted MPEs par-
ticularly involved double prescriptions, but also problems with
trailed zeros (for example, aspirin 3 g instead of 0.3 g), and
problems with continuous infusion prescriptions (for example,
propofol or remifentanil infusion being still activated two days
post extubation). Another example of intercepted MPE
involved the wrong prescription of a tenfold overdose of a
beta-blocker, where rapid intervention of the clinical pharma-
cist intercepted the administration of this overdose. The non-
intercepted potential ADEs were mainly dosing errors or
incompleteness of low molecular weight heparin prescrip-
tions. The two ADEs that occurred in the C-U involved an anti-
biotic overdose (level 2) and a vasopressin infusion overdose
causing cardiac ischemia (level 3.5).
In the PB-U, there were many minor MPEs, mainly because of
illegible writing, incomplete orders, or abbreviations. The inter-
cepted MPEs were mostly errors of negligence (for example,
wrong route of administration) or transcription errors. The
ADEs were mainly dosing errors (especially for antibiotics and
anti-epileptic drugs).
For patients with renal failure, a three-fold reduction of serious
MPEs in the C-U versus the PB-U (12 versus 35, respectively;
P < 0.001) was observed. In the PB-U, 91% of these serious
MPEs were due to dosing errors, which is significantly higher
than the proportion of dosing errors in the C-U (41%, P <
0.001).
In the PB-U we observed a trend toward more prescription
errors with increasing number of drug orders per patient (Fig-
ure 1). In contrast, in the C-U there did not seem to be a higher
risk for errors if the amount of drug orders increased. This sug-
Table 2
Patient characteristics
Characteristic C-U (80 patient-days) PB-U (80 patient-days) P
Age (years) 61.5 (45–71) 54 (37–65) 0.021
Drug prescriptions 17 (11–20) 15 (12.25–18) 0.386
APACHE II 20 (15–30) 20 (16–24) 0.275
SOFA 5 (3–9) 6 (4–8) 0.267
Renal failure (%) 31.2 37.5 0.407
LOS 2 (1–8) 5 (2–9) 0.016
Data are expressed as median with interquartile range in parentheses. Drug prescriptions is the number of drug prescriptions at screening day. 
APACHE II is the acute physiology and chronic health evaluation score at day 0. SOFA is the sepsis-related organ failure assessment score at 
screening day. Renal failure is creatinine clearance <50 ml/minute. LOS, length of stay at screening day. C-U, computerized unit; PB-U, paper-
based unit.Page 4 of 9
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in patients with multiple drug prescriptions.
Types of intercepted and serious MPEs (level 0.5 to 6) are
shown in Figure 2. The dosing errors were the most frequent
type of errors in both groups, followed by double prescription
and drug monitoring errors in the C-U. These last two errors
were rarely seen in the PB-U, which means double prescrip-
tions and drug monitoring errors were new errors resulting
from the computerized system. All double prescription errors,
in both groups, were minor or intercepted MPEs, whereas the
drug monitoring errors were also classified as non-intercepted
potential ADEs (C-U, five out of eight; PB-U, one out of two).
The most common drug classes associated with intercepted
and serious MPEs were antibiotics (PB-U, 23.5% (n = 25); C-
U, 23% (n = 8)), cardiovascular medication (PB-U, 23% (n =
24); C-U, 37% (n = 13)) and sedatives (PB-U, 19.8% (n =
21); C-U 12.5% (n = 4)).
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study evaluating the effect of
CPOE (with a moderate level of CDSS) on MPE's simultane-
ously in a paper-based and an already computerized ICU.
Most other articles studying the impact of CPOE on MPEs
have a before-after design, which induces an important bias in
time [7,15,17,22,30,31]. Additionally, some of these studies
investigated the implementation of a CPOE system, not a full
computerized ICU system with connection to all monitors, ven-
tilators and the hospital information system [7,15].
Our study, like others, shows that CPOE has the potential to
almost completely eliminate minor MPEs [17,32]. The inci-
dence of minor MPEs decreased from 18.3% in the PB-U to
0.7% in the C-U, since completeness and legibility of the order
was mandatory in the CPOE part. However, a missing infusion
rate was still allowed by the system, which caused a few minor
MPEs in the C-U. The wrong pharmaceutical form errors were
configuration errors, which have been adjusted after the study.
Because these minor MPEs are not harmful, and do not place
a great burden on patient safety, they are not discussed in
detail.
The incidence of intercepted MPEs was four times lower in the
C-U than in the PB-U. A few of these errors concerned prob-
lems with trailed zeros, but most of them were double pre-
scriptions, which were identified by the nurse or the physician.
These types of errors did not occur in the PB-U, meaning they
were caused by the CPOE system itself. But as these errors
did not reach the patient, we choose not to assign a severity
level. This is in contrast to the study of Shulman and col-
leagues [22], who rated not only non-intercepted but also the
intercepted errors. Two out of the three major intercepted
errors they described could not have happened with our sys-
tem. For every medication, very detailed predefined standard-
ized drug dosage regimens were created in our CPOE,
thereby limiting the need to adjust a chosen drug prescription
and eliminating the use of pull down menus. For example, in
the case of vancomycin prescriptions, physicians had to order
a 'vancomycin loading dose' and a 'vancomycin dose accord-
ing to plasma level', without having to adjust anything, which
virtually eliminates the risk of making errors.
Table 3
Medication prescription error analysis in computerized and paper-based units
Computerized unit Paper-based unit P
Total prescriptions (n) 1,286 1,224 NS
Total MPEs (n) 44 331 <0.001
% MPEs 3.4 27.0 <0.001
Minor MPEs 9 225 <0.001
Per 100 orders 0.7 18
Intercepted MPEs (n) 12 46 <0.001
Per 100 orders 0.9 3.8
Non-intercepted potential ADEs (n) 21 48 <0.001
Per 100 orders 1.6 3.9
Total ADEs (n) 2 12 <0.01
Per 100 orders 0.15 1.0
Intercepted MPEs and serious MPEs 35 106 <0.001
Serious MPEs 23 60 <0.001
ADE, adverse drug event; MPE, medication prescription error; NS, not significant.Page 5 of 9
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67% decrease, which is similar to several other studies that
reported decreases of 55% to 86% [7,15]. Many patients in
the PB-U experienced at least one intercepted or serious MPE
in comparison to patients in the C-U (67.5% versus 32.5%,
respectively).
The amount of ADEs was significantly reduced by the CPOE.
The two ADEs that did occur in the C-U could not have been
avoided by our current CPOE and moderate level of CDSS.
Comparison between studies remains difficult because there
is no consensus for medication error classification. But when
we compare our results with those of Shulman and colleagues
[22], we do find some important differences. Firstly, we found
a significant reduction in dosing errors in the C-U, whereas
Shulman and colleagues found a higher proportion of dosing
errors in the CPOE group. This could be partially explained by
our method of drug ordering, which virtually eliminates the
need for adjustments in the prescription window. Besides
being a comfortable way of prescribing, it is also less time-con-
suming. Secondly, CPOE caused many minor errors with no
harm, similar to what we found, but they also found many
errors requiring more monitoring. In our study, we only found
two of those errors (classified as ADE level 2) as the ICU is
already a highly monitored environment. Thirdly, in Shulman
and colleagues' study, prescriptions that were not signed
were regarded as a medication error (33.3% of the CPOE
errors). This was not the case in our study, as the ICIS
demands a password for prescribing a drug, meaning that
every prescription is electronically signed.
We believe that our estimate of reducing medication errors in
the ICU by implementing a CPOE is conservative. First, there
could be a bias since the physicians working in the C-U as well
as in the PB-U had an opportunity to learn how to prescribe a
drug correctly (adjusted to renal or hepatic function), which
can account for a lower incidence and severity of MPEs in the
PB-U. Secondly, this study only investigated prescription
errors, and not dispensing or administration errors. Administra-
tion errors are the second most frequent cause of medication
errors, but are rarely studied in the ICU [33-35]. ICIS provides
Figure 1
Scatter plot of number of medication prescribing errors (MPEs) at screening day according to number of drug orders pe  patient (24 hour )
screening day according to number of drug orders per patient (24 hour 
screening day).
Figure 2
Types of intercepted medication prescribing errors (MPEs) and serious MPEs. Dose, dosing error; Rate, wrong infusion rate of continuous medica-
tion; Route, wrong route of administration; Name, error in drug name; Interaction, drug-drug interaction error; Allergy, known allergy to prescribed 
drug; Double presc., double prescriptions; Monitoring, drug monitoring error; Others, errors in posology, concentration, contra-indication.Page 6 of 9
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process by showing important information to the nursing staff
regarding administration procedures and safety.
As in our study, it already has been shown previously that
CPOE can create new problems, such as inconsistent or
duplicate orders [22,36,37]. Causes were related to deficien-
cies in the CPOE system itself or to human shortcoming (for
example, physicians bypassing the normal way of prescribing).
By performing this study, however, we identified problems
within the CPOE system and were able to correct them. The
following examples show that it is very important to objectively
evaluate a newly installed system and correct the problems
you encounter. The first example of a frequent error was the
unnoticed changing of an already activated prescription of a
continuous infusion medication. Since recent upgrading of the
system every continuous infusion prescription change
becomes immediately visible by adding a black sign. Another
problem was the request of drug plasma concentration levels.
They were often being forgotten or, on the other hand, still
asked for when the medication had already been stopped. The
problem lies in the rigidity of the system to electronically pre-
scribe the laboratory item: physicians had to request the labo-
ratory orders on a daily basis and, in contrast to the paper
chart, it was not easy to see which laboratory orders were
made the previous day. Once the study was finished, we con-
figured a more elegant way of laboratory requesting by means
of protocolized laboratory order requests.
The allergy notation was properly filled in 69% of the patients
in the C-U, whereas only 2% had an allergy notation in the
charts of the PB-U. The only allergy error we encountered was
in the C-U in a patient whose allergy status was not noted in
the ICIS, although it was clearly notified in the patient charts.
The study, however, was conducted four weeks after an
upgrade with installation of the allergy notification, and a
recent evaluation showed a more adequate registration. Our
study, however, has several limitations. First, the study took
place at only one tertiary care teaching hospital. The effect of
CPOE on the incidence of MPEs depends on the imple-
mented system; therefore, our results may not be generalized
to other ICU settings and other ICISs.
Secondly, the absolute numbers of ADEs in both our groups
(C-U and PB-U) are higher than those reported in previous tri-
als [11,38]. In the C-U, the incidence of ADEs was 25 events
per 1,000 patient-days, whereas in the PB-U it was 150
events per 1,000 patient-days. In other studies, however, the
amount of ADEs was 10.4 [38] to 19 events per 1,000
patient-days [11]. The fact that this study was conducted in a
teaching ICU could explain this higher number [39]. A second
explanation could be the number and complexity of medication
prescriptions, which increase the occurrence of MPEs. This
has also been previously shown by Cullen and colleagues
[11], who saw a higher rate of preventable potential ADEs in
ICU settings. But when adjusting for the number of drugs
ordered, he found no differences in error rates between ICU
and non-ICU. A third explanation for this higher rate of ADEs
could be the detection method for medication errors. Most
studies involving medication errors and ADEs in the ICU are
retrospective chart reviews (mostly by trained nurses) and/or
self-report studies [3,11,40]. This latter technique is likely to
underestimate the true incidence of medication prescribing
errors [41,42]. In our study, chart review was done prospec-
tively by the clinical pharmacist, who typically found higher
rates of ADEs [43-45]. Additionally, the case finding could be
facilitated by the CPOE system itself, as has been recently
shown by Nebeker and colleagues [42], who also found higher
rates of medication errors than those reported in the literature.
Finally, it is possible that the paper chart, which was prepared
by a resident in advance, contained more mistakes because
the medication file was not adjusted to the clinical status of the
patient overnight, and because of negligence or high work
pressure.
Another potential bias in this study could be that some
patients were at least double screened (17 patients in the C-
U, 18 patients in the PB-U). However, no patient was
screened on two consecutive days. In the C-U, one identical
non-intercepted potential ADE occurred in a patient who was
screened with an interval of three days. In the PB-U, four
patients had at least one completely identical medication error,
with a total of eight identical MPEs. Of these errors, there was
one intercepted MPE, three non-intercepted potential ADEs,
and four minor MPEs. Finally, although rotating physicians and
nurses were unaware of the study registration by the clinical
pharmacist, we cannot exclude the possibility that some bias
may have resulted from some interventions that were made by
the clinical pharmacist to prevent a potentially serious or life
threatening error to occur.
Conclusion
Implementation of CPOE with a moderate level of CDSS
showed a significant reduction in incidence and severity of
MPEs, and significance was found through all levels of sever-
ity. However, CPOE had the highest potential to eliminate
MPEs at the lowest level of severity. Furthermore, evaluation of
the CPOE enabled us to identify newly introduced problems,
and gave us the opportunity to take corrective actions.
This study once again underscores the importance of evaluat-
ing newly installed systems, even if it is a vendor-built product.
To be able to compare different studies, it would be of great
benefit to have a more standardized way of error classification
and detection. This would substantially simplify the discussion
about whether CPOE alone, or with a varying degree of
CDSS, is a more or less effective way of improving quality of
care.Page 7 of 9
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